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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Seventy-nine of the 376 credit institutions surveyed had made loans
to farmers who offered hedged or contracted collateral as security for the
loan.
The proportion of the production credit associations, small banks
and large banks that had made loans to farmers offering hedged collat
eral was not significantly different from the proportions that had made
loans to farmers offering contracted collateral.
Significantly greater proportions of the PCAs than banks have made
loans to farmers on hedged collatera 1.
Significant! y smaller proportions of small banks than either PCAs or
large banks have made loans to farmers on hedged and contracted col
lateral.
Fifty of the respondent agencies had made loans to agribusiness
firms on hedged collateral, while 25 of the agencies made such loans on
contracted collateral, a significant difference.
It seemed that most credit agencies had not made such loans because
they had received no requests from farmers or because they did not un
derstand hedging and forward contracting well enough to know how
such mechanisms should be used.
In general, those credit agencies that had made such loans indicated
that whether the collateral was hedged or contracted or neither made no
difference in deciding whether to grant a loan to a farmer. A significant
percentage however, indicated that it did have an effect on the size of
loan granted.
0 0 0

0 0 0
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Hedging, Forward Contracting
and Agricultural Credit
By Mark Powers
Assistant Professor of Economics

This study was made to determine if hedging and forward con
tracting by farmers and agribusiness firms enhanced their position to
borrow money-more specifically, whether lending agencies considered
the two practices enough of a risk reduction to permit an increase in the
size of loans made on given assets or to encourage favorable interest rate
reductions charged such loans.
In general, it was found that hedging and forward contracting did
have an effect on the size of loans, but not on the interest rates charged.
The advent of futures trading in livestock commodities and the in
creased tendency for producers to contract their production has generat
ed considerable discussion among economists, businessmen and produc
ers concerning the implications of these developments on an individual's
capacity to borrow money. Officials of futures exchanges and of process
ing firms which offer contractual arrangements have long championed
futures trading and forward contracting on the basis that these pricing
mechanisms increase an individual's capacity to borrow money.
Their argument goes as follows: Any farmer or businessman who
hedges or forward contracts reduces his risk because he assures himself
a given price for his production. 1 He is assured a given price through
hedging because the equal but opposite transactions in the cash and fu
tures market should result in losses in one market being offset by gains
in the other market. The forward contract stipulates a price to be paid at
the time of delivery; thus, he is assured a given price. Any farmer or bus
inessman who reduces his risk in such a way is sure to be considered a
better risk by lenders. Thus, lenders will be prone to lend greater
amounts on given collateral.
Considering the intensified need for capital by farmers and business
men, research is needed to determine what effect hedging and forward
contracting might have on one's ability to borrow money. This study is a
first attempt in that direction and as such it is necessarily exploratory.
1
Hedging is defined as the purchase or sale of a futures contract to offset an equal and opposite
transaction in the cash market. Forward contracts are non-standardized, private contracts for the
future delivery of a commodity. In contrast to futures contracts, such contracts are not subject to
the rules and regulations of an exchange and their price is determined by private bargaining.
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STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are:
1. To determine the lending policies of banks and production credit
associations in South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota and Iowa, with
regard to farmers and agribusiness firms who hedge or contract
their production.
2. To determine if hedging and contracting aid the hedger or contract
or in borrowing money.
o o o
0 0 0
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The literature relating to the use
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

of futures trading and contracting
in borrowing money is sparse in
deed. Only one rather limited study
has been completed which relates
to the subject. That study, a part of
a larger study on potato growers and
credit agencies in Aroostook Coun
ty, Maine, was concerned primarily
with determining the number of
credit agencies in Aroostook Coun
ty who had made loans to potato
growers on the basis of hedged po
tatoes and the total amount of such
loans. 2
It was found in that study that 9
of the 21 credit agencies contacted
made loans to growers on the basis
of sales of potato futures contracts.
Such loans for 7 of the 9 agencies
totaled 8 per cent of the maximum
amount of grower loans made by the
21 credit agencies during the season.
In this same study it was also
found that fertilizer companies were
major sources of credit for Maine
potato growers. Five fertilizer com
panies reported credit sales of fer
tilizer to growers on the basis of for
ward contractual arrangements. The
value of the fertilizer sold in this
way exceeded $J� million. No at
tempt was made to quantify the ef
fects of hedging on the loan nor the
interest rate charged. Studies are
needed to quantify these effects.

6

Futures trading and forward con
tracting have long been defended
and championed on the basis that
they aid producers in borrowing
money.This argument stems from
Hicks' classical theory of risk, for
ward planning and interest rates. 8
Hicks, in his discussion of equi
librium and economic systems, sug
gests that decision makers act dif
ferently under risk situations than
they do in no-risk situations.4 He
states, " ... when risk is present,
people will generally act, not upon
the price which they expect as most
probable, but as if that price had
been shifted a little in a direction
unfavorable to them."5
Accepting Hicks' logic, it follows
then that to protect themselves from
risk of loss due to fluctuations in
price, creditors have a tendency to
lend less than the full, expected
value of assets offered as security on
loans. For example, if a farmer
pledges com with an expected marUnited States Department of Agriculture, "The
Economic Importance of Futures Trading in
Potatoes," Marketing Research Report No. 241,
AMS.
sHicks, J. R., Value and Capital, 2nc! edition.
London: Oxford University Press, 1946.
4
Hicks, J. R., op. cit., p. 135.
2

/bid, p. 134.

0

ket value of$1.20perbushel as secu
rity on a loan, the creditor may loan
only $1 per bushel. The 20 cent dif
ference in expected value and loan
value may be termed the risk pre
mium. This risk premium tends to
increase as risk increases. For exam
ple, if the above creditor thought
risks were greater, he might lend
only 90 cents per bushel of corn,
thereby increasing the risk pre
mium to 30 cents.
The problem facing lenders, then,
is one of uncertainty.6 If a mechan
ism could be devised to reduce un
certainty, it follows that lenders
should be willing to lend a greater
percentage of the value of given as
sets pledged for collateral on loans.
Hicks suggests such a mechanism.
In the same discussion on equili
brium, he states:

taken in the past, so that if
these planned supplies can be
covered by forward sales, risk
is reduced."8

"Now there are quite suffi
cient technical rigidities in the
process of production to make
it certain that a number of en
trepreneurs will want to hedge
their sales for this reason; sup
plies in the near future are
largely governed by decisions

(1) because of differences in the

If risk is actually reduced by
hedging and forward contracting,
as has been suggested, it seems logi
cal that farmers pledging a given
amount of hedged or forward con
tracted assets would be able to ob
tain more credit on these assets
than if they had not been hedged or
contracted. The farmers, thereby,
fix a price, and given expected costs,
assure themselves a profit margin.
Further, this would assure a price
for anyone accepting these assets as
collateral for a loan, thus reducing
any risk he would need to assume for
the possibility of a price reduction
or a decrease in the value of these
assets.
Lenders protect themselves in
"A way does exist, within the
several
ways because they are tak
orbit of private enterprise,
ing
several
kinds of risks. One of the
whereby, expectations and
methods
lenders
use to protect
plans can be at least partially
themselves against risk has just been
coordinated. This is the device
mentioned-namely, lending less
of forward trading (including
money than the actual value of the
not only dealings in forward
markets, commonly so called,
assets pledged as collateral for the
but also all orders 'given in ad
loan. A second method involves the
vance, and all long-term con
rate of interest that is charged on
tracts)."7
the loan. Rates of interest depend on
several
things. Hicks points this out
He is suggesting futures trading
in
his
chapter
on interest rates.
and forward contracting as methods
"The money rates of interest
of reducing uncertainty by estab
paid for different loans at the
lishing prices in advance. He points
same date differ from one an
out very distinctly that hedging re
other for two main reasons:
duces risk.
GKnigh�, F. H., in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.
_Mifflin and Company,
Cambndge: Hought?n
_
1921, makes a d1stmct10n between risk and
uncertainty; however, the terms are used inter
changeably in this discussion.
;Hieb, J, R., op. cit., p. 35.
8

7

fbid., p. 137.

length of time which the loans
are to run, and in the way re
payment is to be distributed
over time: (2) because of differ
ences in the risk of default by
the borrower."9

In summary, the borrowing ca
pacity of any individual is limited
primarily by the risk that he pre
sents to a lender. This risk takes the
form of risk of default on the loan,
and risk of a decrease in the price of
the assets which are pledged as col
lateral for the loan. We have seen
that lenders protect themselves from
these risks in one of two ways; either
by lending less than the full market
value of the assets w h i c h are
pledged or by charging a higher in
terest rate. Hicks has suggested
methods of reducing these types of
risks, namely, the use of forward
contracts or futures trading which
enables a producer to hedge the as
sets he pledged, to guarantee a
price, to reduce his risk, and there
by reduce the risk to the lender.

Stonier and Hague emphasize the
important effect risk has on interest
rates charged. They state:
"No firm, however reput
able,
can guarantee
that
changes, for example in con
sumers' tastes, will never affect
its profits, and the greater risk
incurred by those who invest in
commercial bonds means that
they will demand a greater re
turn. The more risky the invest
ment, the higher the return de
manded.1110

In short, it is the risk of default by
the borrower that is responsible for
the element of risk premium in in
terest rates.
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
For purposes of this analysis, the and production credit associations
credit agencies were divided into ( PCAs) have extended credit to
three categories: large banks, small farmers and agribusiness firms on
banks and production credit associ the basis of hedged or forward con
ations. Large banks were defined as tracted collateral. If those credit
those banks having more than $10 agencies had not extended credit to
million in total assets. The data used borrowers on that basis, the reasons
in the analysis were collected by a why such credit had not been ex
series of two mail questionnaires. tended were to be determined.
The first questionnaire was sent
The second questionnaire was
to a random sample of 440 banks sent to the 102 banks, and 30 pro
drawn from a population of 2,005 duction credit associations that in
banks listed in Polk's Bank Directory dicated on the first questionnaire
for the states of South Dakota, Min that they had extended credit to
nesota, Nebraska and Iowa, as well hedgers and forward contractors.
as to 65 production credit associa Twenty-one of the PCAs, 38 of the
tions within these states. Ninety small banks, and 30 large banks re
large banks, 252 small banks and 53 turned the questionnaire.
production credit associations re.
.
"Ibid., pp. 142-143.
turned the first
· questionnaire. .
10Stonic:r, A. W., and Hague, D. C. A Textbook
The purpose Of this questionnaire of Economic Theory, New York: Wiley and
was primarily to determine if banks
Sons, Inc., 1953, p. 446.
8

third case he had forward con
tracted the collateral. Thus, the re
sponses should not be considered
the results of actual loans, but rath
er the results of what the respond
ents said they would do if faced
with this situation. This approach
was used to isolate the effects of
hedging and contracting.
This study is concerned with both
farmers and agribusiness firm bor
rowers. For purpose of this research,
farmers were defined as those in
volved in producing primary agri
c u 1 t u r a 1 products. Agribusiness
firms were defined as those involved
primarily in purchasing agriculture
commodities for the purpose of pro
cessing, storing, or transporting the
commodities.

The purpose of this questionnaire
was to obtain general information
a b o u t the borrowers who had
hedged and contracted, the types of
loans made to these borrowers and
whether hedgers and forward con
tractors received larger loans on
given assets and/or lower interest
rates on loans secured by hedged or
forward contracted collateral.
To determine the latter factor,
respondents were given three case
situations in which they were asked
to make decisions on the interest
rates and the percent of asset value
they would loan. The case situations
were identical except that in one
case the individual had not hedged
or contracted his collateral, the sec
ond case he had hedged and in the

•••

•••

Extent to Which Credit
Agencies Have Made Loans
on Hedges and Contracts
The objectives of this section are:
1. To determine the extent to which credit agencies have made loans
to farmers and agribusiness firms on the basis of their hedging or con
tracting operations.
2. To determine why those agencies which have not made such loans
did not.
The discussions on the extension of credit to farmers and to firms
have been separated for two main reasons: First, to simplify the presen
tation and, second, because it is possible that credit agencies may follow
one lending policy for farmers and another for firms.
9

EX EN ION OF CRE I O F RMER
T S
T T
S
A
D

Table 2. Chi-Square Values Computed
from Data Presented in Table 1

The data in Table 1 indicate that
in all cases the number of credit
agencies which had made loans on
hedged collateral was greater than
the number that had made loans on
f o r w a r d contracted collateral.
About one-third of all agencies re
sponding have made loans on
hedged collateral or forward con
tracted collateral.
Although t!ie numbers varied,
proportions of the various credit
agencies which had made loans on
hedged collateral were approximately equal to proportions that had
made loans on contracted collateral,
The chi-square value of 1.2689 in
Table 2 indicates that there was no
significant difference in these proportions between hedged and forward contracted collateral.
Greater proportions of the PCAs,
however, have had experience with
hedgers borrowing money than have
the large banks. The chi-square
value of 5.606 is significant. This can
be partly explained by the fact that
PCAs are likely to have a larger proportion of agriculturally related customers than do large banks and the
agricultural customers are the ones
. who would be using the futures
market because most commodities

Comparisons

Total Chi-Square ____________________
Hedge vs. Forward Contract
Large
Banks vs. PCA.s/Hedge______
Large
Banks vs. PCAs/Contract _
Large Banks and PCAs
vs. Small Banks/Hedge ____
Large Banks and PCAs vs.
Small Banks/Contracts ____

Chi-Square
Values

39.949*
1 .2689

5 .606*
.376
2 1 .03 1 *
1 1 .667*

•significant at .05 level.

traded on futures contracts are agri
cultural products. There was no dif
ference between the proportion of
large banks and PCAs that had
made loans on contracted collateral.
A significantly smaller proportion
of the small banks than of the large
banks or PCAs have had experience
in making l o a n s to farmers on
hedged collateral as well as con
tracted collateral. Both the chi
square values of 21.031 and 11.667
are significant.
There are several plausible ex
planations for these differences.
First, it is very possible that the clientele of the agencies are different.
Small country banks are more likely

Table 1. The Number of PCAs, Large Banks and Small Banks that Have Extended
Credit to Farmers on the Basis of Hedged or Forward Contracted Collateral

PCAs

Have
Extended . Credit ________ 24
Have Not
Extended Credit ________ 28
Totals _________________ ____ 52

Hedge
Small Large
Banks Banks

Forward Contracts
Small Large
PCAs Banks
Banks

34

21

14

29

19

210
244

59
80

32
46

200
229

56
75

10

Table 3. The Number of Large and Small Banks that Have Extended Credit to
Firms on the Basis of Hedged or Forward Contracted Collateral
Forward Contract
Hedge
Large Small Large
Small
Banks Banks Banks Banks

Have Extended Credit ·------------------------- 23
Have Not Extended Credit _____________ ____ 273
Totals ______________ -----------------------------___ ____ 2 96

to have smaller farmers as their cus
tomers while large banks are more
likely to have larger, more progres
sive farmers as their customers.
Often the larger farmers are the ones
who use the futures market and who
contract their production. Second,
large banks are more likely to have
agricultural credit specialists who
understand the use of the futures
market and contracting in reducing
risk and therefore would urge their
customers to use such tools. Third,
PCAs are more likely to get requests
for such loans because they have a
larger proportion of farmers as cus
tomers than do the large banks.
EXTENSION OF CREDIT TO FIRMS

Many of the same banks that
made loans to farmers on the basis
of the farmers' hedging or contract
ing arrangements also made such
loans to agribusiness firms. Since
PCA.s make loans only to farmers
they are not included in this section.
The proportions of the credit
agencies that have extended credit
on hedged collateral are signifi
cantly different from the propor
tions that have extended credit on
contracted collateral. A much small
er proportion of the agencies have
had experience with forward con
tracting than with hedging ( see Ta
b]es 3 and 4) . Part of the reason for
this difference stems from the fact
that most of the credit agencies sur-

27
52
79

8
218
226

17
58
75

veyed are located in an area which
pro<luces commodities for which a
widespread system of forward con
tracting has not been developed.
Futures trading, on the other hand,
is a highly developed system and is
easily available for everyone.
There is also a significant differ
ence between the proportions of
small banks and large banks that
have extended c r e d i t on both
hedged and contracted collateral.
Fewer small banks have made such
loans than large banks ( see Tables
3 and 4) . This difference may be at
tributed to two major factors. First
there are, undoubtedly, differences
in the clientele of the different size
banks. Second, capital requirements
of agribusiness firms are usually
quite large compared to capital re
quirements of farmers. Many small
banks might not be able to make the
necessary amounts of capital avail
able, thus, the firms would tend to
patronize large banks that could
supply a complete line of credit.
Table 4. Chi-Square Values Computed
from Da!a Presented in Table 3
Comparisons

Chi-Square
Values

Total . Chi-Square __________________
Hedge vs. Forward Contract
Large Banks vs.
Small Banks/Hedge __________
Large Banks vs.
Small Banks/Contract ______

11

*Significant at .05 level.

69.373•
4.284*
37.8 14*
27.275*

REASONS

FOR NOT EXTENDING CREDIT TO HEDGERS
AND FORWARD CONTRACTORS

In all the instances considered ers nor the borrowers understood
ahove. more than 50 per cent of all the futures market and forward con
the credit agrncies had not extended tracting arrangements well enough
credit on hedged or forward con to use them effectively in actually
tracted collateral. Since results such reducing risk. This undoubtedly
as this were anticipated, those credit was an important factor in their not
agencies which had not extended receiving requests for such loans.
such credit were asked to indicate
Responses which were included
why.
in the category OTHER included:
The overwhelming majority of the
"Borrower had hedged but
respondents indicated that they did
was a poor risk a nyway a n d
not extend such credit, primarily
w e did n't wa nt t o m a ke the
because there were no requests for
l oa n ."
such loans. The data in table 5
"Had s u ggested the borrow
show that 57 per cent of PCAs, 70
ers hedge but they refused to
per cent of the small banks, and 67
do so."
per cent of the large banks who re
"Fa rmers have n ot req u est
sponded to the question had re
ed such loa n s beca use they pre
fer to g a m b le."
ceived no such requests. A signifi
"The hed g i n g was not tied to
cant proportion of the three groups
a tota l m a rket i n g progra m ."
also indicated that neither the bankTable 5 . Reasons why PCAs, Small Banks and Large Banks Have Not
Extended Credit to Hedgers or Forward Contractors

A. No requests for such loans __________
B. The borrower did not understand
the futures market ________________________
C. Our institution has no one who
understands the futures market
D. Did not think the borrower
had reduced his risk ____________________
E. Other ---------------------------------------------Totals* ----------------------------------- ________

•••

Large Banks
No. Per Cent

PCAs
No. Per Cent

Small Banks
No. Per Cent

26

56.5

204

69.6

55

67.0

6

13.0

33

1 1 .2

10

12.1

5

J 0.8

41

1 3.9

7

8.5

2
7
46

4 .3
1 5.2

3
12
293

1 .0
4.0

1
9
82

1 .2
1 0.9

•figures are rounded .
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The Effect of Hedging and
Contracting Operations
on Loans Made to Farmers
and Firms
This section analyzes the responses from those credit agencies which
had made loans on hedged or contracted collateral.
The objectives of this section are to determine:
(a) The importance of hedging and forward contracting relative to
other credit factors.
(b) Whether these credit agencies required or advised their clients
to hedge or forward contra(:t.
( c) What percent of their customers do hedge or contract their pro
duction.
( d) What effect hedging and contracting have on interest rates
charged and size of loans made on given assets.
The data used in this analysis were obtained from mail question
naires sent to 132 banks and PCAs in 4 states. Eighty-nine, or 67.4 per
cent, of the questionnaires were completed and returned.
For purposes of this analysis the respondents have been divided into
the five following categories: ( 1) PCAs that extend credit to farmers, (2)
small banks that extend credit to farmers, ( 3) small banks that extend
credit to firms, ( 4) large banks that extend credit to farmers and (5)
large banks that extend credit to firms.
Since some of die banks extend credit to both farmers and firms that
hedge or forward contract commodities, some of the respondents have
been placed in two categories.
0 0 0
0 0 0
HEDGING AND FORWARD CONTRACTt NG AS
FACTORS IN MAKING LOANS
In making the decision on wheth- place more emphasis on their inter
er or not to grant a loan to an indi- pretation of the integrity, the mana
vidual, most lending agencies do not gerial ability, and the general re
place much importance on whether payment a b i 1 i t y ( exclusive of
the collateral for the loan is hedged hedges or contracts signed) of the
or forward contracted. Only 3.8 per borrower. In general, the type of
cent of the respondents considered collateral pledged as security, the
hedging and contracting as very im- amount of the loan, the current in
portant considerations when making debtedness of the borrower, the
such a decision ( see Table 6) . They availability of farm records, the size
13

Table 6. Relative Importance of Factors Considered When Agencies Make Loans
Very
Minor
Important
Important
Importance
Unimportant Total
No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No.

1 . Integrity of borrower 86
2. Managerial ability __ 74
3. General repayment
ability ( exclusive
of hedges or contracts
signed ) ____________________ 68
4 . Type of collateral
offered ( i.e., grain,
livestock ) ________________ 1 5
5. Amount of loan ________ 1 3
6. Current
indebtedness ____________ 24
7. Availability of farm
records ______________________ 8
8 . Age of borrower ______ 1
9. Size of farm or firm 7
1 0. Forward contracts
signed by the
borrower -�---------------- 3
1 1 . Hedging operations
of the borrower ______ 3
12. Per cent of income
spent on living
expenses __________________ 3

96.6
83 . 1

3
14

3 .4
1 5 .7

7 6.4

21

23.6

1 7 .0
1 6.4

69
45

78.4
57.0

4
17

4.5
2 1 .5

27 .9

58

67.4

3

3 .5

13.1
1 .8
8.0

42
22
44

68.8
38.6
50.6

10
30
26

1 6.4
52.6
29.9

3 .8

24

30.4

28

3.8

24

30.0

5.1

38

64.4

of farm or firm and the percentage
of income spent on living expenses
are all considered as important
credit factors.
Most of the agencies, 65.8 per
cent, considered forward contracts
signed by the borrower and 66.3 per
cent considered hedging operation
of the borrower to be of minor im
portance or relatively unimportant
factors in deciding whether or not
to grant an individual a loan. This
.- ·1ggests that most lenders did not
regard these methods of reducing
price risks as being of primary im
portance in establishing a line of
credit.

89
89

1 .1

89
5.1

88
79

1 .2

86

1
4
10

1 .6
7.0
1 1 .5

61
57
87

35.4

24

30.4

79

31

38.8

22

27.5

80

11

1 8.6

7

1 1 .9

59

4

ADVICE GIVEN ON HEDGING AND
FORWARD CONTRACTING
OPERATIONS
The decision to hedge or forward
contract collateral rests on the in
dividual farmer or firm. None of the
banks or PCAs required their cus
tomers to hedge or forward contract
agricultural commodities pledged
as collateral for loans, but 24. 1 per
cent of them advised customers to
hedge and 18.0 per cent advised
customers to contract, whenever
possible ( see Table 7 ) .
This hesitancy on the part of
credit agencies to make such a stip
ulation or to give such advice could
reflect several things. First, it could

14

Table 7. Number and Pro portion of Credit Agencies That Advise or
Re quire Customers to Hedge or Forward Contract
Require
No. Per Cent

Advise
No.
Per Cent

Hedge ---------------------------- ____
Forward Contract ________ ____
Totals ----------------------------

24.1
1 8.0

20
16
36

be that many credit agencies lack
confidence in their ability to offer
such advice. Second, it is possible
that the credit agencies believe that
farmers and agribusiness firm man
agers are so unfamiliar with hedg
ing and forward contracting as
methods of reducing risk that to re
quire or advise them to use these
· tools without first gaining complete
knowledge of their use could result
in some bad experiences for both
the borrowers and the credit
agency.

Neither
Require Nor Advise
Per Cent
No.

63
73
1 36

75.9
82.0

Total
No.

83
89
1 72

siderably, ranging from beef and
hogs to eggs and wheat, to castor
beans and sunflower seeds. These
latter two commodities were men
tioned as forward contracted com
modities by only one or two PCAs.
Data presented in Table 8 indi
cate that hedged and forward con
tracted beef, hogs, corn and soy
beans, were pledged as coilateral
more often than were eggs, wheat
and potatoes. It also appears that
conb·acted eggs are used as collat
eral in more instances than are
hedged eggs. Further, it seems that
only a very small per cent of the
lending agencies' borrowers were
involved in hedging on contracting
operations.

TYPES OF COMMODITIES AND PER
CENTAGES OF PRODUCTION
HEDGED OR CONTRACTED
The types of agricultural com
modities hedged and contracted by
respondents' borrowers varied con-

Table 8. Proportion of Borrowers from Lending Agencies Who
Hedge or Forward Contract Commodities, By Commodity
Per Cent of Total Borrowers
Commodities H 1 FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC

1-10

1 1 -20 2 1 -30 3 1 -40 41 -50 5 1 -60 61 -70 71-80 8 1 -90 91-100

Beef __________ 44 20
Hogs ________ 1 6 14
Eggs ________

Corn ________
Soybeans __
Wheat ____
Potatoes ____
Other ________

I

6

33 29
25 27
7 3
_ ___
_ ___

2

(Number of Agencies )
-- 1

2

2
6 I 4
9 I 8
1 2

-- -- -- -- 2

-- -- -- 3

-- I

1

H-Hedge
2
FC-Forward Contract

15

-- 3

Table 9. Proportion of Borrower's Total Production
Which Is Hedged or Forward Contracted

Percent

Hedged
Livestock
No. of
Agencies

1-10 -------------------1 1-20 --------- ---------2 1 -30 -------------------31-40 -------------------41-50 -------------------5 1 -60 --------------- ·---61-70 -------------------71-80 -------------------8 1 -90 -------------------91-100 ------------------

Hedged
Grain
No. of
Agencies

---7
8
2
19
3
---21
---5

8
4
7
4
13
3
1

For the bulk of the agencies, less
than 10 per cent of their borrowers
were hedging or contracting their
collateral. Very few agencies had
more than 30 per cent of their cus
tomers involved in such operations.
Only in the cases of eggs and the
specialty crops of sunflower seeds
and castor beans, did agencies with
customers producing such crops
have 100 per cent of such customers
forward contracting. It was also in
dicated by the respondents that all
of the borrowers who received such
loans had previously established a
line of credit with the institution.

Forward
Contracted Forward Con
Livestock tracted Grain
No. of
No. of
Agencies
Agencies

11
6
5
2
3

2
2

10
4
6
1
11

2

3

their total production. In only 10
cases had borrowers hedged or con
tracted 90-100 per cent of their pro
duction ( see Table 9 ) .
TYPES O F LOANS MADE TO
H EDGERS

Whenever a hedger buys or sells
a futures contract, he must deposit
some monev with his broker as a
sign of his ., good faith in fulfilling
the obligations for which he has
contracted. This money is called
"margin money." If the price of the
contract should move adversely to
the hedger in the sense that he
would incur a trading loss if he were
to close out his futures contract, he
may be asked to deposit more mar
gin money as a further sign of his
good faith. If the price moves in a
direction favorable to the hedger,
his margin money will be returned
to him along with any profits he has
made at the time he closes out his
hedge. All of this means that a hedg
er must have ready cash available
for margin money at the time he

The farmers and firms who had
obtained loans on hedged or con
tracted collateral had hedged or
contracted only a portion of their
production. Most of them did not
hedge more than 50 per cent of
their livestock production and none
of them hedged more than 80 per
cent of their grain production. Simi
larily, with the forward contracted
collateral, most of the borrowers
had contracted less than half of
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Table 10. Types of Loans Made to
Hedgers

used for operating and production
capital only.

Number

Loans made for purposes of pro
viding margin money present some
added problems to lending agen
17
cies. One of these problems is con
cerned with who maintains legal
41
authority to terminate the hedge
71
when repayment of the loan is
based on the hedged collateral. If
initiates the hedge and during the the borrower maintains the right to
time the hedge is in effect.
terminate the hedge at his discre
Thus, credit agencies were asked tion, the lender could find his col
whether the loans they had made to lateral unprotected from price
hedgers were for margin money change.
only, operating capital only, or a
Most of the credit agencies who
combination of the two. Data in
Table 10 indicate that most of the made loans on hedged collateral,
loans made were for a combination however, evidently were not too
of the two. However, in 13 of the concerned about this problem. On
c a s e s, hedgers evidently had ly two of the respondents indicated
enough operating and production that they alone retained the right to
capital but did not have ready cash terminate the hedge. Several indi
available for meeting margin re cated it could only be terminated
quirements. Thus, they received by joint agreement and the rest in
loans which were to provide mar dicated that hedgers were allowed
gin money only. Seventeen hedgers to conduct their hedging operations
received loans which were to be as they wished.
Loans for Margin Money Onl Y-----Loans for Operation and
Production Capital Only ____________
Loans for Margin Money and
Production Capital ______________________
Total --------------------------------------------

(

I

13

•••

•••

Hedging and Contracting
As Aids in Obtaining Loans

ll

We now turn our attention to the second major objective of this
study, to determine whether hedging and forward contracting aid the
borrower in obtaining loans. This analysis is divided into two major
parts:
The first part is concerned with the effect hedging and contracting
have on the size of loans relative to the market value of the collateral.
The second part of the analysis deals with the effects of hedging and
contracting on interest rates. The analysis deals with both farmers and
agribusiness firms and with both livestock and grain assets.
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NUMBER OF CREDIT AGENCIES MAKING LOANS TO FARMERS
ON THE BASIS OF HEDGING OR CONTRACTING OPERATIONS
vVith about half of the respondent
credit agencies, a farmer could re
ceive increased amounts of credit
if he secured his loan with hedged
or contracted livestock assets rath
er than with non-hedged or non
contracted livestock assets. Twen
ty-four out of the 45 agencies that
had made loans on hedged livestock
and 21 out of the 42 agencies that
made loans on contracted livestock
indicated they would increase the
size of loan ( see Tables 11 and 12 ) .

of PCAs, small banks and large
banks that would extend increased
credit to farmers who offered
hedged grain rather than non
hedged grain as collateral Similar
ly, the chi-square value in Table 14
indicates that there is no significant
difference in the proportions of the
various credit agencies that will in
crease the amount loaned on for
ward contracted grain. Therefore,
if a farmer offers hedged or con
tracted grain as collateral, there is
about an equal chance that any of
The chi-square test indicates
the three types of agencies will
there is no significai{t difference in
offer him increased credit.
the responses of the various credit
agencies, thus indicating that the
AMOUNTS OF INCREASE ON
sa me proportion of small banks,
LIVESTOCK 1 1
large banks and PCAs will extend
greater amounts of credit on
The data in Table 15 indicate that
hedged and forward contracted
livestock than on non-hedged and the average increases in loans on
non-contracted livestock. This sug h(;dged livestock ranged from 12.2
gests that any farmer who hedges per cent to 17.5 per cent of the
or contracts his livestock has about value of assets. On contracted live
an equal chance of obtaining in stock the average increases ranged
creased credit on those assets at any from 1 1.9 per cent to 18.3 per cent.
of the three classes of credit agen All of these increases are signifi
cantly greater than zero, thus indi
cies.
cating
that hedging and forward
Hedged and forward contracted
contracting
of livestock assets do aid
grain can also be used by farmers
to gain increased amounts of credit the farmer in obtaining capital by
on given assets. About three-fifths increasing the amount loaned on
of the respondents indicated they given livestock assets.
would increase the amount loaned
on hedged grain over non-hedged 1 1
Anal ysis of variance was used to determine if
grain and about two-thirds said
there was a signfi.cant difference between the
they would do so on contracted
average amounts the various credit agencies in·
dicated they would loan to farmers who hedge
grain ( see Tables 13 and 14 ) . The
or forward contract col l ateral. Preliminary
chi-square test on the data in Table
analysis of the data indicated that the samples
had a common variance and it was assumed
13 indicates that there is no signifi
that errors were independent and random,
cant difference in the proportions
thus making analysis of variance applicable.
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Table 1 1. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned to
to Farmers Who Hedge Livestock
Response

Small
Banks

PCAs

Increase Loans __ 8
Do Not
Increase Loans ____ 7
Totals __________________ 1 5
Computed chi-square = .536
Level of Signficance = .05

Large
Banks

Totals

9

7

24

6
15

15

8

21
45

Tabular chi-square = S.991
Degrees of Freedom = 2

Table 12. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned
to Farmers Who Forward Contract Livestock
Response

PCAs

Increase Loans ---------------------------- 7
Do Not Increase Loans ______________ 6
Totals ------------------------------------------ 13
Computed chi-square = .429
Level of Significance= .05

Analysis of variance tests on the
data in Table 14 indicate that there
was little difference in the responses
of the various agencies. The '-'F"
values shown in Table 16 indicate
that there was no significant differ
ence in the average increases the
agencies would grant on hedged
livestock as opposed to the average
increase they would grant on con
tracted livestock. Thus, suggesting
that all of the agencies would allow
about the same increases on hedged
livestock as they do on contracted
livestock assets. Further, the data
indicate that between the agencies,

Small
Banks

Large
Banks

8

6
8

7
15

14

Totals

21
21
42

Tabular chi-square = S .99 1
Degrees of Freedom = 2

no difference exists in their re
sponses on hedged livestock or in
their responses on contracted live
stock. Thus, suggesting that a farm
er would get approximately the
same increases at each of the agen
cies, regardless of whether he of
fered hedged or contracted live
stock as collateral.
AMOUNTS OF INCREASE ON
GRAIN

There was little variation in the
average amounts each of the differ
ent classes of agencies would in
crease loans on hedged and con-

Table 13. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned
to Farmers Who Hedge Grain
Response

PCAs

Increase Loans -------------------------- 1 0
Do Not Increase Loans ____________ 7
Totals ------------------------------------------ 1 7
chi-square= . 8 1 9

Computed
Level of Significance = .05

Small
Banks

Large
Banks

7
7

10

14

5
15

Tabular chi-square = S .9 9 1
Degrees o f freedom = 2

19

Totals

27
19
46

Table 14. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned
to Farmers Who Forward Contract Grain
Response

PCAs

Small
Banks

Large
Banks

Totals

8
7
15

9
5
14

28
15
43

Increase Loans _________________ _________ 1 1
Do Not Increase Loans ______________ 3
Totals ------------------------------------------ 1 4
Computed chi-square = .363
Level of Significance = .05

Tabular chi-square = 3 .84 1
Degrees of Freedom = !

Table 15. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Farmers on Hedged and
Contracted Livestock Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted
Livestock Assets, All Credit Agencies
PCAs
Per Cent

Methods of Risk Reduction Compared

Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ______________ 1 7.5*
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 1 7.9*

Small
Banks
Per Cent

Large
Banks
Per Cent

1 2 .2*
1 1 .9*

1 2 .6*
1 8.3*

*Significant at .05 level .

Table 18. Comparisons and Computed
Values of Analysis of Variance on Data
in Table 17

Table 16. Comparisons and Computed
Values of Analysis of Variance on Data
in Table 15
Comparisons

Computed F
Values

_

Comparisons
_________

Computed F
Values
_____ _

Hedge vs. Forward Contract _____
Large Banks and Small
Banks vs. PCAs/Hedge __________
Large Banks and Small
Banks vs. PCAs/Contract.__ _____
Large Banks vs. Small
Banks/Hedge __________________________
Large Banks vs. Small
Banks/Contracts ______________________

Hedge vs. Forward Contract ____ .05 1
PCAs and Large Banks vs.
Small Banks/Hedge ______________ .395
PCAs and Large Banks vs.
Small Banks/Contract __________ 1 . 1 1 0
PCAs vs. Large Banks/Hedge _ 0.0
PC As
vs. Large Banks/Contract______ .680
Error mean square = 5 . 1 60
Level of Significance = .05

.026

. 1 04
.698
.026
.28 1

Error mean square = 4 .570
Level of Significance = .05

Table 17. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Farmers on Hedged and
Contracted Grain Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted Grain
Assets, All Credit Agencies
PCAs
Per Cent

Methods of Risk Reduction Compared

Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ______________ 10.9*
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 1 1 .4*
*Significant at .05 level.
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Small Banks Large Banks
Per Cent
Per Cent

1 4.3*
1 4.5*

1 5 .9*
1 9.5*

tracted grain. The data in Table 17
indicate that on hedged grain the
average increases were 10.9 per
cent by PCAs, 14.3 per cent by
small banks and 15.9 per cent by
large banks. On forward contracted
grain the average increases were :
PC.As-11.4 per cent, small banks
14.,5 per cent, and large banks 19.5
per cent. All of these increases are
significantly greater than zero.
Thus it seems that hedging and for
ward contracting also increase the
amounts loaned on gram assets.
Analysis of variance was also
used to determine if there was a
difference in the credit policies of
PCAs and large and small banks
with respect to average increases in
amounts loaned to farmers on the
basis of hedged or contracted grain.
The comparisons are similar to
those made on livestock. The com
puted "F" values presented in Table
18 again indicate that PCAs, large
banks and small banks all extend
similar increases in amounts loaned
to farmers who hedge or forward
contract grain pledged as collateral.
There not only is no significant dif
ference when comparisons are
made between credit agencies con
sidering the same method of reduc
ing risk, there also is no significant
difference between the increases

due to the risk reducing methods
themselves. This suggests that the
credit agencies consider hedging
and forward contracting as being
equally useful in reducing price
risk.
It can be concluded from this
analysis, therefore, that farmers
can expect to get approximately the
same amount of increase on loans
secured by hedged or contracted
grain from PCAs, large banks, and
small banks.
LOANS TO FIRMS

Of the 50 credit agencies who in
dicated on the first questionnaire
that they had made loans to agri
business firms, only 21 responded
to the second questionnaire. When
these responses were classified ac
cording to large and small banks,
hedged and forward contracted
grain and livestock, there were not
enough responses in any one class

to conduct statistical tests. Never

theless, the responses are presented
in Tables 19 and 20. The data sug
gest that hedging and forward
contracting do have a positive in
fluence on the size of loans granted.
However, since statistical tests can
not be conducted, an absolute judg
ment is withheld.

Table 1 9. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Firms on Hedged and
Contracted Livestock Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted
Livestock Assets, All Credit Agencies
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared

Small Banks
PCAs
No. Per Cent No. Per Cent

Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ________________ 0
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 0

2
21

1 5 .0
1 0.0

Large Banks
No. Per Cent

3
2

1 5 .0
27.5

INTEREST RATES AS RELATED TO HEDGING AND CONTRACTING

Economic theory as explained
suggested that the rate of interest
was dependent upon several factors.
Inc]uded among the factors was
risk. It was theorized that if a bor
rower hedged or contracted the as
sets he used as collateral for a loan,

he reduced his risk of loss from price
change, and that this in turn reduc
ed risk of the lender. Therefore, if
interest rates were dependent in
part on risk and if risk were reduced,
then interest rates on loans should
also be reduced.

Table 1 9. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Firms on Hedged and
Contracted Livestock Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted
Livestock Assets, All Credit Agenci�s
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared

PCAs
No. Per Cent

Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ________________ 0
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 0

Small Banks
No.
Per Cent

2

1 5.0
1 0.0

Large Banks
No.
Per Cent

3
2

1 5.0
27.5

Table 20. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Firms on Hedged and
Contracted Grain Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted Grain
Assets, All Credit Agencies
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared

PCAs
No. Per Cent

Small Banks
No.
Per Cent

2
3

Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ________________ 0
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 0

1 7.5
1 5 .0

Large Banks
No.
Per Cent

6
2

1 5.0
1 0.0

Table 2 1 . Number of Credit Agencies Which Increase Interest Rates to Farmers on
Loans Secured by Hedged and Contracted Collateral, All Credit Agencies
PCAs
Small Banks
Large Banks
Grain Livestock Grain Livestock Grain Livestock

Decrease I nterest Rates ------------·--------- 0
Do Not Decrease I nterest Rates ______ 1 9

0
19

0
16

0
16

0
17

0
17

Table 22. Number o f Credit Agencies Which Decrease Interest Rates to Fi�ms on
Loans Secured by Hedged and Contracted Collateral, All Credit Agencies
Grain

Livestock Grain

0

Decrease Interest Rates __________________ 0
Do Not Decrease Interest Rates ____ 0

0

The results of this study do not
appear to substantiate this hypothe
sis. Analysis of the data in Tables 21
and 22 indicates that not a single
agency which had made loans on
hedged and contracted collateral
reduced the interest rates on such
loans. Further, it made no differ
ence whether the loans were made

0

6

Livestock

0
6

Grain

Livestock

14

14

0

0

t o farmers or t o agribusiness firms
or whether the collateral was
hedged or contracted livestock or
grain. Therefore, it appears that
hedging and contracting have no
effect on interest rates.
There are probably three
major reasons for these results.
First, some of the lenders prob-
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ably believe that hedging and
forward contr�cti!lg do not re
duce their risk. Tliis is prob
ably true of those agencies
which indicated that they
would not increase the amount
loaned on hedged or contract
ed assets. Those agencies
which would increase the
amounts obviously did not
feel that way. Second, a num-

her of the respondents indicat
ed that they based the interest
rate on their cost of money, not
on the different amounts of
risk presented ·by farmers or
firms. Third, it is quite likely
that the risk reduction has
been fully accounted for by
the increase in the size of the
loan.

•..

...

Sum m a ry, Concl us ions and
Recommendations
Following J. R. Hicks' theory, many writers, economists and busi
nessmen have advocated futures trading and contracting arrangements
on the basis that hedging and forward contracting aid producers in bor
rowing money. No previous research has been completed which sup
ports these statements. This study is a step in that direction.
0 0 0
o o o

The analysis of the extent to
which credit agencies have made
loans on hedges and contracts indicate that about one-third of all responding agencies have made such
loans. The proportions of the various credit agencies which have
made loans on hedged collateral
were approximately equal to the
proportions that had made loans on
contracted collateral. Significantly
greater proportions of the PCAs
than the large banks have had experienc.e with hedgers borrowing
money. And significantly smaller
proportions of the small banks than
either PCAs or large banks have
had such experience with both
hedgers and contractors. Much of
the differences are undoubtedly
due to differences in clientele.
The primary reason why many of
the various credit agencies have not

extended credit on the basis of
hedged or contracted collateral is
that they have had no requests for
such loans. A significant proportion
of the respondents also said they
had not made such loans because
either they or the borrower did not
understand the use of hedging and
forward contracting as a means of
reducing risk. This suggests the
need for educating both borrowers
and lenders of the value of reduc
ing price risk through proper hedg
ing and forward contracting proce
dures.

None of the credit agencies re
quired their farm and firm custom
ers to hedge or contract collateral,
although a few advised such an ac
tion. Hedging and contracting
were considered to be of minor im
portance to most of the credit agen23

cies when considering whether or
not to make a loan to a farmer or
agribusiness firm.
CONCLUSIONS

It appears, therefore, that in
most cases hedging and forward
contracting can improve a borrow
er's line of credit, but cannot be
considered vital to gaining credit.
In most cases only a small percent
age of an agency's borrowers at
tempted to borrow money on
hedged or contracted assets and
usually only a small proportion of
the borrowers production w a s
hedged or contracted.
Although most credit agencies
indicated that hedging and con
tracting did not seem to rank as fac
tors of major importance to a bor
rower attempting to obtain a loan,
it was found that a significant num
ber of the credit agencies would of
fer significantly larger loans to
farmers on hedged or contracted
collateral than on non-contracted or
non-hedged collateral. Further, it
made no difference whether the col
lateral was livestock or grain. Thus,
it is concluded that hedging and
forward contracting do aid the
farmer in obtaining larger loans on
given assets. It was also found that
there was no difference among the
various credit agencies in the
amount they would increase the
size of the loan.
The number of respondent agen
cies that made loans to agribusiness
firms on the basis of the firm's
hedged and contracted collateral
was so small that it was impossible
to conduct statistical tests on the
data. The data from those that did

24

respond, however, indicated that
greater credit would be granted on
hedged and contracted assets than
on non-hedged and non-contracted
assets.
None of the respondent credit
agencies indicated that they would
reduce the interest rates charged on
loans if the loans were secured by
hedged or contracted collateral
rather than by non-hedged or non
contracted collateral. This was true
regardless of whether the collateral
was livestock or grain assets and
whether the loan was to a farmer or
an agribusiness firm.
It is obvious from the above anal
ysis that many bank managers, PCA
managers and farmers have had
limited experience with hedging
and contracting operations and that
many of them do not understand
the use of these tools in reducing
price risk. This suggests that the fu
tures exchanges and extension per
sonnel from the land-grant univer
sities may have an important re
sponsibility in educating farmers
and managers of credit agencies on
the potential use of these tech
niques in reducing price risk.
NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The current study is limited to
production credit agencies and
banks. Yet marketing firms and
farm supply firms are also impor
tant sources of capital to farmers
and some of them advance credit to
growers in return for the promise of
delivery of part of the crop. For ex
ample, fertilizer companies often
enter agreements with farmers for
the future delivery of a quantity of
a commodity equal in price to the
cost of the fertilizer. The fertilizer

company then hedges the commod
ity, thus protecting its position.
More research needs to be con
ducted to determine the extent to
which such arrangements are used
by farmers as a means of obtaining
capital.
Further research is also needed
'>n the use of futures trading and
contracting not only as an aid in ob-

•••

taining capital but also as an inte
grated part of the management of
a farm or agribusiness firm. Re
search is also needed to deter
mine how lending agencies calcu
late the risk in a loan, how they cal
culate the amount of risk that is
reduced when a borrower hedges or
contracts, and what price to put on
this risk.

•••
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